Introduction
Over the last decade, concerns about global warming, local air quality, and energy security have led to a plethora of actual and proposed initiatives at the federal and state levels, particularly in the power sector. These measures aim to reduce emissions, promote electricity generation from renewable sources, and encourage energy conservation. Examples of policies include:
• Performance standards, such as maximum emission rates per KWh of electricity and energy efficiency standards for household appliances.
• Portfolio standards and market share mandates, such as required production shares for renewable or "clean" energy sources.
• Subsidies and tax relief for renewable sources like wind power, solar, geothermal, and biomass generation.
• Policies to price greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, and related proposals to shift some of the tax burden onto energy or pollution.
However, little attention has been paid to whether these myriad policy efforts work together or at cross purposes. Research on policy instrument choice in the context of multiple interacting policies and market failures has been identified as an important area of further investigation (Goulder and Parry 2008) . In other words, it is important to recognize that the whole of our energy policy mix is going to be quite distinct from the sum of its parts-and possibly less than that sum (Fischer and Preonas 2010) .
For most of these policies, the primary motivation is addressing an emissions externality, such as the damages from air pollution or the risks of climate change. If that were the only problem, then only one policy instrument would be needed: an appropriate emissions price or other mechanism to "internalize the environmental externality". Indeed, once a binding emissions cap is in place, supplemental policies for renewable energy and energy efficiency (EE) lead to no incremental emissions reductions, but rather drive down the emissions price, which tends to benefit the dirtiest energy sources (Boehringer and Rosendahl 2010a) . By distorting the market allocation of abatement, the supplemental policies actually increase overall compliance costs-unless there are other market failures.
Perhaps the "kitchen sink" approach we observe of combining many modest policies represents an attempt to compensate for a policy failure-political constraints against imposing a sufficiently robust emissions price. However, two additional kinds of market failures are often cited as rationales for technology-related incentives. One is imperfections in the market demand for energy efficiency. These imperfections may arise due to the lack of credible information, landlord-tenant arrangements, or myopic behavior, but they generally present themselves as an undervaluation of energy efficiency in the purchase of energy using appliances or homes. A second is spillovers from knowledge accumulated through research and development (R&D) or learning by doing (LBD). Because firms are unable to appropriate the full benefits arising from their innovations, they do not have sufficient incentive to develop and deploy new technologies. The presence of such policy and/or market failures will affect the relative desirability of different policy combinations. Fischer and Newell (2008, henceforth FN) assessed different policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and promoting innovation and diffusion of renewable energy, with an application to the electricity sector. The stylized model represents two stages, one in which investments in R&D and LBD are made, and a second stage in which the resulting innovations are applied. The article revealed that, due to knowledge spillovers, optimal policy involves a portfolio of different instruments targeting not only emissions, but also learning and R&D. Despite those spillovers, however, the most cost-effective single policy for reducing emissions is an emissions price, followed by (in descending order of cost-effectiveness) an emissions performance standard, fossil power tax, renewables share requirement, renewables subsidy, and lastly an R&D subsidy.
In this paper, we extend and update the FN model in several important ways. First, we distinguish between conventional renewable energy sources (like wind or biomass) and advanced technologies (like solar), which have different costs and learning or innovation potential. In this way we can better assess the performance of overlapping policies in terms of the kinds of technological change they induce.
Second, we incorporate a richer representation of electricity demand over time, including short and long-run investments in energy efficiency improvements. As a result, we can incorporate demand-side policies for improving energy or fuel efficiency. We also allow for imperfections in the demand for energy efficiency, as well as in the market for innovation. We analyze how these different imperfections affect optimal policy combinations and also the relative cost-effectiveness of single or otherwise suboptimal policies.
Third, we expand our representation of the nonrenewable generating sectors, in order to better evaluate proposals like a Federal clean energy standard (CES). This requires differentiating between natural gas turbines and combined cycle generation, as well as recognizing greater long-run potential for nuclear energy. Finally, we update the entire parameterization based on more recent data, particularly for renewable energy supplies.
The electricity sector is an appropriate subject for this analysis, being the most affected sector by proposed policies for climate mitigation. Electricity generation accounted for roughly 40% of CO 2 emissions in the United States in 2010 (EPA 2012) . However, the potential emissions reductions from this sector are much larger than its share of total emissions. Analysis of an economy-wide policy for climate mitigation concluded that well over 80% of cost-effective emissions abatement would stem from the electric power sector (EIA 2011a).
In our framework, a carbon price is a powerful and necessary tool, but on its own it is not fully efficient. The optimal policy portfolio would include additional tools to bring the For simplicity, we assume that no discounting occurs within the first stage; this assures that behavior within that stage remains identical. However, let δ represent the discount factor between stages. It is possible to allow for discounting within the second, longer stage by altering 2 n to reflect such discounting; in that case 2 n can be thought of as "effective" years.
Nonrenewable sectors
We distinguish the nonrenewable sectors as mature sources of power generation that will not experience significant technological change relative to renewable sources. 2 These sources include coal (x), natural gas turbines (ng), natural gas combined cycle (cc), and nuclear (nu). Most opportunities for CO 2 abatement in electricity generation arise from fuel switching; generation efficiency improvements tend to explain little of the predicted reductions in climate policy models (see, e.g., [10] C q ′′ > ). In our numerical model, we will assume these supply curves are linear in the neighborhood of the price changes considered.
Let P t be the retail price of electricity. Let t τ be the price of emissions at time t, as might be implemented with an emissions tax or through a cap-and-trade system. Let i t φ represent the net tax on generation from source i, which may be explicit or implicit, as with the portfolio standard. Profits for the representative firm of nonrenewable source i are revenues net of production costs and taxes paid:
2 While it is of course not strictly true that fossil-fueled technologies will experience no further technological advance, incorporation of a positive, but slower relative rate of advance in fossil fuels would complicate the analysis without adding substantial additional insights. An exception is room for advancement in lowering costs of cleaner generation technologies for fossil fuels, like carbon capture and storage. Our qualitative results should carry over to policies targeting other low-carbon technologies, although the quantitative results would depend on the cost, technology, and emission parameters particular to those other technologies.
The firm maximizes profits with respect to output from each fuel source, yielding the following first-order conditions: 0 : ( ) .
Thus, each source of generation is used until its marginal costs-inclusive of their respective emissions costs-are equalized with each other and the price received. Totally differentiating, we see that
This equation reveals that renewable energy policies crowd out each nonrenewable source in direct proportion to the changes in the net price received and in inverse proportion to the slopes of their competing supply curves. Note that an emissions price is the only policy to differentiate among emitting sources, so higher emissions prices lead to a larger reduction in more emissions-intensive sources, like coal, than policies that treat the nonrenewable sources alike.
Renewable energy sector
We characterize the renewable energy sector as not only being clean (nonemitting), but also as being a less mature industry that is still experiencing significant technological change.
Within this sector, we make a distinction between two kinds of renewable energy technologies: a relatively mature technology (w), such as wind or biomass, and an advanced technology (s), like solar. We do include hydropower in the baseline (h20), but assume it provides baseload capacity that does not change over time, in quantity or in cost. The focus here is on the new renewable sources.
Unlike the nonrenewable sources, the costs of generation for renewable sources depend on a stock of knowledge that can be increased through research and development (R&D) or learning-by-doing (LBD). We assume that for j={w,s}, these generation costs, ( , )
increasing and convex in output, and declining and convex its own knowledge stock, 
where 2 2 2 ( , )
Let ρ be a factor reflecting the degree of appropriability of returns from knowledge investments. 4 For example, 1 ρ = would reflect an extreme with perfect appropriability and no knowledge spillovers, while 0 ρ = reflects the opposite extreme of no private appropriability of knowledge investments. Similarly, 1 ρ − reflects the degree of knowledge spillovers. This representation of aggregate appropriation as a share of the total benefits was formally derived in FN. We assume that all knowledge is ultimately adopted, either by imitation or by licensing.
Therefore, the spillover factor does not enter directly into the aggregate profit function, which reflects operating profits. Licensing revenues also do not appear because they represent transfers among firms. However, the spillover factor does enter into the first-order conditions for R&D and learning, since it determines the share of future profit changes that can be appropriated by the representative innovator. These issues are further elaborated in the Appendix of FN.
The resulting first-order conditions are (dropping the superscripts for now): 
As shown in equation (3), each renewable energy source produces until the marginal cost of production equals the value it receives from additional output, including the market price, any production subsidy, and the appropriable contribution of such output to future cost reduction through learning by doing (note that the last term in equation (3) is positive overall). Secondstage output does not generate a learning benefit, so there is no related term in equation (4).
Meanwhile, as shown in equation (5), the firm also invests in research until the discounted appropriated returns from R&D equal investment costs on the margin.
Note that if appropriation rates are imperfect ( 1 ρ < ), from a societal perspective, firms have insufficient incentive to engage in extra production for the purpose of learning by doing. Similarly, if the R&D subsidy does not fully reflect the spillover values ( 1 σ ρ < − ), firms have insufficient incentive to invest in R&D. Thus, a knowledge externality accompanies the emissions externality, and both can be affected by policies that target one or the other.
An important difference between the renewable and nonrenewable sectors is the response across time to policies. The nonrenewable sector behavior depends only on current period prices and policies, while renewable sector responses are linked over time through innovation incentives. We see these interactions by beginning to totally differentiate the first-order conditions, observing the bracketed terms that depend on knowledge accumulation:
Thus, for the same price effects, the renewable energy sectors respond differently in the two periods, and R&D investment depends indirectly on the price policies, through the effects on second-period costs.
Consumer demand and energy efficiency investments
Demand for electricity is derived from consumers' own optimization problem. Consumers experience utility ( ) durable equipment, and other long-lived determinants of energy demand fall in the latter.
However, given the longer duration of the second stage, those "short-run" improvements may reflect a blend of both shorter and longer-run opportunities over this horizon.
We also allow for market imperfections in the demand for EE reductions. The representative agent may face incomplete information, may be myopic, or may otherwise perceive that it would not fully benefit from EE investments. Let 
The representative consumer maximizes net utility by choosing a level of energy services and rates of EE improvements in each stage (i.e., 1 2 1 2 1 , , , ,
In period t, given any energy consumption rate per unit of service (which is determined simultaneously), the representative consumer maximizes utility with respect to v, resulting in the first-order condition ( )
Let ( , ) Differentiating consumer utility with respect to short-run EE improvements, and simplifying the expression for energy payments, we obtain the following first-order conditions in each stage:
In other words, consumers balance the marginal net cost of improving EE with the perceived energy costs of that period.
The choice of long-run EE improvements depends on both current and future energy spending, as well as the respective EE benefit valuation rates:
Thus, policies that raise energy prices and thereby energy expenditures lead to increased investment in energy efficiency.
In equilibrium, total consumption must equal total electricity production, the sum of nonrenewable and renewable energy generation:
Change in consumer surplus is calculated as the change in net utility.
Economic surplus
Policies also have implications for government revenues, which we denote as V. We assume that any changes in government revenues are compensated by (or returned in) lump-sum transfers. The amount of these transfers equals the tax revenues net of the cost of the subsidies:
Environmental damages are a function of the annual emissions and the length of each stage; however, we will hold cumulative emissions constant across the policy scenarios, so a change in damages will not be a factor in the welfare comparisons. The change in economic surplus due to a policy is then the sum of the changes in consumer and producer surplus and revenue transfers from the subsidy or tax:
where
Since consumer payments to firms and tax and subsidy payments are transfers, we can simplify the representation of economic surplus to be ( )
Of course, economic surplus is unlikely to be the only metric for evaluating policy.
Other indicators may be consumer surplus, renewable energy market share, and so on. General equilibrium factors-like interactions with tax distortions, leakage, or other market failures-can also be important for determining welfare impacts. 6 Political economy constraints may also be important for determining policy goals. To the extent that these unmodeled issues are present, this partial equilibrium presentation of economic surplus within the sector will not reflect the full social impacts; still, it represents a useful baseline metric.
Policies
Policy interventions cause the entire system to re-equilibrate. In all cases, the retail price of electricity is an endogenous variable that signals the value to producers (and consumers), and policies can create a wedge between the retail price and the price received by a particular kind of producer. As seen in the preceding equations, the slope of the supply curve determines the sensitivity of the quantity produced with a given technology to changes in the net price.
Importantly, the effect of policies and combinations on the retail price-not only in magnitude but in some cases in direction-can depend on the slopes of these curves in relation to one another. For example, using a static model, Fischer (2009) explains how renewable portfolio standards may decrease or increase retail electricity prices, depending on these factors. The current model adds more complexity through the dynamic effects of induced technological change.
FN distinguishes between fixed-price policies and endogenous price policies. Fixed-price policies set a particular tax or subsidy rate, such as an emissions tax, a nonrenewable energy tax, or subsidies for renewable sources. Endogenous price policies are market mechanisms that rely on tradable allowances-such as emissions cap-and-trade, renewable portfolio standards, or low carbon fuel standards-and allow the market to set the price that reflects the cost of complying with the regulation. Imposing new policies on sectors that are already regulated under these latter schemes will only affect the market price of allowances-the new policies will not affect the regulatory outcome (i.e., emissions or renewable energy level), which is already set by the cap or standard.
In other words, with a binding emissions trading scheme, zero incremental emissions reduction will be realized from a supplementary renewables quota system; rather, the additional shift toward renewables will cause the emission allowance price to fall, so that the cap is maintained (e.g., Morris 2009; Pethig and Wittlich 2009 ). Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010a, 2010b) point out that the lower permit prices can favor the dirtiest fossil fuel technologies; while overall fossil fuel production falls as a result of the combined regulations (which lower the prices received by these producers), the dirtiest producers actually increase output to keep total CO 2 emissions at the binding emissions cap. Moreover, additional policies that support renewable energy (like production subsidies) also induce fossil sources to expand alongside them to maintain the mandated market shares, resulting in higher emissions. These are a few examples of the unintended consequences of combining policies with tradable quota mechanisms.
If the emissions pricing system is otherwise efficient-that is, in the absence of other market failures-then supplementary policies for renewable energy are unnecessary and actually raise total compliance costs, even if emissions prices are lower. Fischer and Preonas (2010) review several articles making this argument. If an emissions cap (or sufficient carbon tax) is politically infeasible, then clean energy policies may be deemed a second-best alternative for reducing emissions. However, under an emissions constraint, they lose this effect, so the rationale for supplemental support for clean technologies must be to address other market failures. In this paper, we address two important market failures frequently raised regarding clean technologies: knowledge spillovers, and undervaluation of the benefits of EE investments.
Optimal policies
In the presence of multiple market failures, a carbon price is a powerful and necessary tool, but on its own full efficiency is not achieved. Additional tools are necessary to bring the first-order conditions of the individual actors in line with that of the social optimum. The optimal policy portfolio would include multiple instruments:
1. A carbon price to address the environmental externality, rising according to the discount factor ( 1 2 τ δτ = (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
No additional taxes on fossil energy sources or subsidies to mature (second-period) renewable generation. 4. An R&D subsidy equal to the R&D spillover rate ( 1 σ ρ = − ). 5. Subsidies to EE investments to offset the unvalued share of EE benefits, both in the short and long term:
An important point to note is that we do allow the market failures to vary by technology: mature versus advanced supply technologies, and short versus long-term EE investments. If these market failures do vary, a "technology neutral" policy will not be efficient.
Formally, the welfare implications of additional policy-induced changes can be derived by totally differentiating the social welfare function:
( ) (
Next, in a series of steps, we use the decentralized first-order conditions (Equations (1), (3)- (5), and (12)- (14)) to substitute for the expressions of marginal costs and marginal utility that must hold in equilibrium. Then, we use the fact that total changes in consumption equal total production changes: 1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  , , , ,
(1 )
(
In other words, additional energy efficiency improvements are welfare enhancing if the subsidy is less than the degree of undervaluation. Similarly, increases in renewable generation improve welfare if the production subsidy is less than the spillovers from LBD. Additional R&D enhances surplus if the R&D subsidy does not exceed the R&D spillover rate.
Consider a carbon price alone as a starting point, with 1 2 τ δτ = .
Next, we can look at deviations in which total emissions are held constant with the policy variation, 
(1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( 
The last line represents the costs: additional fossil taxes that reduce fossil generation lower surplus, as do additional renewable subsidies that increase renewable generation.
Note that if we substitute in the optimal policies listed above, we have dW = 0, and economic surplus cannot be increased with additional policy deviations.
Suppose instead we impose a portfolio standard policy that pins down the ratio r between renewable and non-renewable generation, so , 
. Although the policy is revenue neutral overall, on the margin it imposes a cost. Whether it increases welfare depends on the extent to which it helps internalize the non-environmental market failures. It will generate positive knowledge spillovers, but the energy efficiency effects depend on whether the portfolio standardraises or lowers the electricity price.
This intuition will be useful in interpreting our numerical results.
Numerical application

Functional forms
Generation and knowledge
The functional forms for generation and knowledge follow those of FN unless otherwise noted. All production cost functions are quadratic in output, yielding linear electricity supply curves for each fuel source. For nonrenewable sources of electricity generation, the costs all take the form The knowledge stock assumes a commonly used functional form expressing a constant elasticity relationship with respect to both the stock of experience and the stock of R&D: 
Energy efficiency
Details of our energy efficiency parameterization are in the Appendix. We assume a utility function that leads to constant elasticity demand:
, where 0 1 ε < < . The elasticity ε can be interpreted as a very short run elasticity, as might be reflected in the rebound effect (i.e., the rebound effect reflects the change in energy services, such as lumens, with respect to the change in the cost of those services). The full short-run elasticity of demand for electricity will also include short-run responses in the energy intensity of those services.
We assume linear marginal cost of EE improvements around the baseline, so for each type of improvement j, costs are a quadratic function 
In other words, the intercepts of the marginal cost functions are determined in part by our assumptions regarding the perceived valuation factor for each type of EE improvement.
To calibrate the slopes of the marginal costs of EE improvements, we derive the implicit short, medium and long-run elasticities of electricity demand. To do so, we solve for energy efficiency investments from the first-order conditions, evaluated with no additional policy measures (i.e., in the absence of subsidies). Next, we totally differentiate the demand function (since changes in energy efficiency depend on quantities as well as prices in each period), evaluated at the baseline. Solving for the equilibrium quantity changes due to a price change, this exercise gives us a system of four equations (own and cross-price elasticities for each period).
Setting these expressions equal to our target elasticities, we solve for our calibrated values of For simplicity, we also fix conventional natural gas generation (i.e. boilers and turbines) and hydro generation in both periods. 8 See Lindman and Söderholm (2012) for a meta-analysis, and also Jamasb (2007) . 9 One exception is Kobos et al. (2006) , which empirically derives two-factor learning curves for wind and solar. However, their results across several scenarios are inconclusive on whether R&D or learning-by-doing has a stronger effect on either technology. There is an extensive empirical literature on estimating the price elasticity of electricity demand. We assume a very short-run demand elasticity of 0.10 Because we discount the second stage back to the present at a rate of 7%, this implies a discount factor 0.71 δ = and a second stage with the effective length of n 2 = 10.1. Table 1 shows the parameters associated with electricity generation cost functions and energy efficiency investment functions (derived using the equations in the Appendix). Table 2 lists the other parameters that do not vary over time, including CO 2 emissions intensity, R&D investment, knowledge appropriation rates, and target demand elasticities. As the model does not permit an analytical solution, we numerically solve the nonlinear system of equations using Newton's method.
11 See Kamerschen and Porter (2004) 
Results
Baseline
The baseline results are reported in Table 3 and represent the no-policy scenario. Of note is the relatively small share of renewable energy in the baseline (6% in the first stage and 8% in the second), nearly all in the form of mature non-hydro renewables, such as wind, biomass, and geothermal (denoted "wind" for simplicity). Solar remains a fraction of a percent of generation.
Significant renewable energy cost reductions are expected in the baseline, with wind costs falling 9% and solar costs falling 30%.
An important point is that market behavior in the model is independent of the assumptions about the perceived energy efficiency benefit valuation rates (β jt ). Essentially, the model is calibrated to observations or projections of market outcomes, being agnostic about the underlying drivers in demand for energy efficiency. These parameters, however, are important for calculating the welfare costs of policy interventions. 
Emissions price and optimal policy combinations
In all subsequent comparisons, we require each policy (or combination thereof) to meet the same cumulative emissions target, which is 20% below baseline emissions. The policy scenario results will be reported in relation to these baseline values; welfare consequences will be reported relative to the benchmark policy of an emissions price without supplementary policies. Table 4 compares the effects of an emissions price program to optimal policy combinations, depending on the EE benefit valuation rates. Again, market behavior under the emissions price is independent of these valuation rates, but the welfare costs of the policy are smaller in the presence of an EE market failure. The additional investments in EE induced by higher electricity prices confer additional benefits when these improvements are undervalued.
The cumulative emissions target implies that the optimal emissions price will rise over time, from $11 per ton CO 2 in stage 1 to $24 in stage 2. With only innovation market failures (i.e., no EE undervaluation), the optimal policy combination still involves similar emissions prices in the two stages ($10 and $23, respectively). To internalize the innovation spillovers, these prices would be combined with a substantial 50% R&D subsidy, but a very modest subsidy to learning in the first stage: 0.3 cents/kWh for wind and 0.6 cents/kWh for solar. Altogether, the optimal combination of policies lowers costs 12% relative to the cap alone, again assuming no EE market imperfections.
In the presence of market failures in demand for EE improvements-we model a 10% undervaluation-the optimal policy mix changes more substantially. The inclusion of EE subsidies induces more demand-side conservation, allowing for lower emissions prices (nearly 30% lower than with an emissions price alone) to achieve the same emissions target. The optimal subsidies for learning among renewable energy sources also fall. Relative to an emissions price alone, the optimal combination of policies lowers costs by a third. Understanding the optimal policy combinations builds intuition for understanding the effects of single policies and non-optimal combinations.
Single policies
Similar to FN, we first consider the relative cost effectiveness of single policies for meeting the same 20% cumulative emissions reductions target. In each case, policy stringency is adjusted over time to minimize the present value of costs.
With the fixed-price policies, a single instrument is applied, without differentiating among the covered generation sources. For example, the fossil tax, t φ , is imposed equally upon all fossil-fuel sources. The renewable subsidy (production tax credit) uses a fixed subsidy path that does not distinguish between wind or solar. The EE subsidy is applied as a percentage of investment costs, although it does distinguish between short-and long-run investments.
We also consider three revenue-neutral policies with self-adjusting prices. The emissions performance standard sets an intensity target; in essence it combines a tax on CO 2 with a rebate to all generation in proportion to the standard, such that above-average emitters pay a net tax and below-average ones gain a net subsidy. Specifically, ∑ ∑ . 14 The clean energy standard is a sort of hybrid of the preceding two policies and is based on recent proposals. Although it nominally sets a target of a certain percentage of energy from clean sources, in essence it offers full credits to renewable sources, 50% credit to natural gas-CC generation, and 10% credit to generation from existing nuclear and hydropower facilities. Credits are funded through a revenue-neutral tax on all generation. Table 5 reports the policy targets for each strategy. Figure 1 presents the relative welfare effects of each single policy option for achieving the reduction target, compared to the costs under an emissions pricing policy. For example, when no EE market failure is present, using an emissions performance standard costs 11% more than the emissions price, the fossil fuel tax and CES policies have similar effects (less than 50% higher costs). On the other hand, relying solely on an RPS entails costs 2.7 times as high, and a renewable production subsidy or an EE subsidy costs 5 times as much as emissions price alone.
The latter policies are especially costly because they do not encourage fuel switching among conventional energy sources or conservation through higher electricity prices.
The relative effects change when EE improvements are undervalued by consumers. In particular, the discrepancy is larger between policies that raise electricity prices (and thereby induce more of the underprovided EE improvements), and those that rely more on subsidies or renewable energy. Interestingly, the fossil fuel tax becomes more cost effective than the emissions performance standard, meaning the EE interactions are more important than differentiating among fossil energy sources. Notably, even with significant spillovers from technological change in renewable energy or undervaluation in energy efficiency, policies that simply focus on those sectors are still much less cost-effective than emissions pricing.
Combination policy scenarios
Next, we consider a variety of common policy combinations. In each case, we have an emissions pricing program that ensures meeting the 20% cumulative reduction target.
First, we consider the effects of an RPS. This policy implicitly subsidizes renewable energy production with a revenue-neutral tax on nonrenewable energy production. Recall that the optimal policy mix called for a small subsidy to production in the first stage, with the solar subsidy being about twice that of wind. Without the accompanying R&D subsidy to counter R&D spillovers, there may be additional benefits to knowledge accumulation through learning as a substitute. On the other hand, without the cost reductions from additional R&D, one expects less reliance on renewable energy (given a cap), which can reduce the expected benefits from learning.
In the reference scenario, renewable energy is 8.0% of generation in the first stage and 11.6% in the second. We calculate the RPS in each period that most improves welfare in conjunction with a cap, first assuming no undervaluation of energy efficiency. Those standards are 8.4% in the first stage and 12.1% in the second. The corresponding subsidies are 0.27 cents/kWh in the first stage, lower than the optimal subsidies, and 0.31 cents/kWh in the second, which is obviously higher than the optimal second-stage subsidy of zero. These differences arise due to the effects of the implicit tax that pays for the subsidies and the uninternalized R&D spillovers. These policies are very modest and together reduce the welfare costs of the cap by only 1.5%. Notably, any more aggressive renewable energy policies lower welfare.
The ability of an RPS to improve cost effectiveness is also influenced by the EE market failures. With 10% undervaluation, no RPS in the first stage can improve welfare, and the best second-stage RPS is barely binding. The reason is that the RPS-at these modest stringenciesactually lowers electricity prices, exacerbating the underprovision of EE improvements.
Similarly, we calculate EE standards that improve welfare in combination with a cap. In the reference scenario, EE improves by 2.3% in the first stage and 5.7% in the second. With no undervaluation, no EE standard improves welfare-not only because there is no demand-side market failure to internalize, but also because it exacerbates the knowledge market failure: reducing demand and the electricity price also reduces renewable energy knowledge investments, which are underprovided due to the spillovers. With 10% undervaluation, these second-best EE standards are close to the optimal EE improvements (3.7% and 8.3% in stage 1 and 2, compared to 3.9% and 8.3% in the optimal combination). However, the required subsidies are lower, due to the absence of the renewable energy technology policies, which would otherwise keep electricity prices lower. These EE policies lower the cost of the cap by 17% (whereas the optimal policy combination lowers costs 26%).
Next, we consider the effects of policy combinations with stringent targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency, as inspired by the European Union's 20/20/20 Directive. Its targets call for a 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels, a 20 percent cut in energy consumption through improved energy efficiency by 2020 and a 20 percent increase in the use of renewable energy by 2020. We model these targets as binding in the second stage. Importantly, these targets far exceed the welfare maximizing levels we just calculated. Indeed, they are so stringent that the cap becomes nonbinding. 15 Let us take as the main reference case 0.5 ρ = and .9
x β = , so there is some justification for complementary technology and energy efficiency policies. However, these market failures do not justify the 20/20/20 combination, which the model calculates as being 5.6 times as costly as the cap alone.
We then explore the sensitivity of the costs of these combination policies to our knowledge and EE market failures. Figure 1 holds knowledge spillovers as fixed at 0.5 and shows the effects of increasing the rate of undervaluation of energy efficiency. The cost effectiveness of the cap increases monotonically and even turns into a welfare gain by a 25% undervaluation, but the 20/20/20 policy cost effectiveness is even more sensitive to this parameter. We also compare to a policy without the RPS, of combining the cap with a 20% EE improvement standard by the second stage. For undervaluation rates exceeding a quarter, this policy generates higher welfare than the cap alone. (We do not explore larger values of undervaluation, since the model finds it hard to explain baseline behavior at higher values). Figure 3 compares the welfare effects of these policies as we vary the rate of knowledge spillovers (1 ) ρ − . The costs of both the cap and the 20/20/20 policies decrease as the knowledge market failure increases, but less dramatically than with the energy efficiency undervaluation. In part, neither the RPS policy nor the EE standard directly target the main knowledge market failure, which is the R&D spillovers. When we exclude the EE standard and add only the 20% RPS by the second stage, we find that the costs are lower than the 20/20/20 policy and more sensitive to the spillover rate, but they still remain more than three times the cost of the cap alone. policies, but not to the point where costs are lower than the cap alone. For example, adding an optimal R&D policy cuts costs roughly in half. Offering double credits for solar, which more closely mimics the optimal production subsidy profile, lowers costs somewhat but not substantially.
Conclusion
We conclude that some technology policies can be useful complements to a program of emissions pricing for reducing greenhouse gases when additional market failures are presentnamely knowledge spillovers and consumer undervaluation of energy efficiency improvements. However, these justifiable policies are likely to be much more modest than the suite of renewable energy policies being proposed.
In particular, even assuming high rates of knowledge spillovers from learning by doing, ambitious renewable portfolio standards seem unlikely to be welfare enhancing. Given that "getting the prices right" on emissions raises electricity prices and improves the competitiveness of renewable energy, large additional subsidies for renewables are unnecessary. Even for "next generation" technologies like solar energy, with larger potential for cost reductions, the optimal subsidies in support of learning-by-doing seem minor. Correcting R&D market failures, on the Although we have not presented additional sensitivity analysis with respect to our assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge accumulation and appropriation, such an exercise was conducted in FN, without change to the basic results. We therefore find that ambitious renewable portfolio standards are unlikely to be welfare enhancing, unless other goals and benefits are in play, such as energy security or other benefits of energy supply diversification.
The desirability of stringent energy efficiency policies, on the other hand, is very sensitive to the degree of undervaluation. Given the importance of this parameter, and the lack of consensus within the literature, further empirical investigation of energy efficiency investment behavior will be of great benefit to policy analysis.
Finally, it is telling that even with more refined representations of electricity generation options and market failures, emissions pricing still remains the single most cost-effective option for meeting emissions reduction goals. Technology policies are very poor substitutes, and when they overreach, they can be poor complements too. Substituting these functional forms into the first-order conditions, we can derive the EE improvements: (1 ) (
Thus, the elasticity is a combination of the very short-run demand elasticity (absent changes in energy intensity) and the longer run demand changes resulting from changes in energy intensity.
We also need to derive the "cross-price" elasticity of demand in one period with respect to the price in the other period. There is no direct effect on demand, but rather an indirect effect from changes in EE. Specifically, an increase in the other period's price increases long-run EE investments; however, some of these improvements will tend to be offset by fewer short-run investments.
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